Purefoy v. Rogers and The Rule Against Perpetuities by Stapleton, Basil D.
CASE COMMENTS  •  NOTES •  CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 263
Purefoy v. Rogers and The Rule Against 
Perpetuities
INTRODUCTION
T he com m on law rule against rem oteness o f vesting is alive and 
living in New Brunswick. Despite the statutory reform s to which the rule 
has been subjected elsewhere,* and despite the strong representations 
for reform  which have been presented in this ju risd iction ,2 the rule 
survives in its com m on law form.
T h at this is, o r should be, a m atter o f  serious concern, must be 
obvious to anyone who is familiar with the rule and its implications and 
consequences. Any rule o f law which can be described accurately as “a 
technicality-ridden legal n ightm are” and "a dangerous instrum entality in 
the hands o f most m em bers o f  the bar"3 must be one that is ripe for 
reform .
O ne o f the harshest aspects o f  the rule is the fact that it applies ab 
initio. If  there is any possibility, however slight, that an interest can 
violate the rule then that interest is declared void ab initio. O ne is not 
perm itted  to wait and see if the rule will be violated in fact. T his is one 
o f the principal aspects o f the rule which has undergone statutory 
reform  in o ther jurisdictions where a “wait and see” approach has been 
ad o p ted .4 And it is certainly an area o f reform  which is to be 
encouraged.
Pending the adoption o f such legislation, it may be useful to note 
that there is limited scope for the application o f a “wait and see" 
approach  in New Brunswick u n d er the present regim e o f law. T hat is
‘See, for example, the English Law o f Property Act 1925 and Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, the 
Ontario Perpetuities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 343, as well as legislation adopted in several of the United States 
o f America beginning in Pennsylvania in 1947.
*The most detailed proposals for reform are contained in “Survey of the Law of Real Property — A 
Working Report" prepared by Alan M. Sinclair, Q.C. and Douglas G. Rouse, Q.C. for the Law Reform 
Division, Department o f Justice, New Brunswick, and presented in 1976.
3W. Barton Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style", (1953-54) 67 H aw. L. Rei'. 1349.
It is worth noting the full paragraph in which that desc ription o f the rule is contained.
T he Rule against Perpetuities is a technicality-ridden legal nightmare, designed to meet problems of 
past centuries that are almost nonexistent today. Most of the time it defeats reasonable dispositions of 
reasonable property owners, and often it defeats itself. It is a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of 
most members of the bar. It ought to be substantially changed by statute, and the lawyers ought to see 
that this is done.
*Supra, footnote 1.
possible th rough the com bined application o f two rules o f law respecting 
fu tu re interests, namely, the “timely vesting” rule and the rule in Purefoy
v. Rogers. 5
T h e  principal purpose o f  this note is to exam ine how the 
application o f those rules can prevent an interest from  being subject to 
the rule against perpetuities and prevent it from  being void ab initio. 
T his can have very real practical significance particularly as regards 
attem pted testam entary dispositions within a family.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
By way o f introduction to the main topic o f this note it would be 
useful to review the main elem ents o f the ru le against perpetuities. T he  
rule is stated by Gray as follows:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after
some life in being at the creation o f  the interest.®
T h e  public purpose o f  the rule is to prevent property  from  being 
subjected to contingencies for too long a period o f time. Contingencies 
tend to make property  less attractive to prospective purchasers and thus 
tend to render the property  inalienable in practice. Inalienability has 
been viewed traditionally as being contrary  to the public interest because 
it reduces the utility o f  property. T h e  rule accomplishes the purpose o f 
retaining free alienability by striking down fu tu re contingencies which 
are too rem ote and  which would, therefore , tie the property  up  for too 
long.
At this point it would be useful to recall what can cause a fu ture 
interest to be contingent. T h e  causes are th ree (a) the fact that the 
g ran tee is unborn; (b) the fact that the gran tee is unascertained; and (c) 
the fact that there is a condition precedent which must be satisfied 
before the grantee is entitled to take the interest.
If a testator were to devise Blackacre to his son A for life with 
rem ainder to A’s first child, then the rem ainder interest in the first child 
would be contingent if A did not have any children at the time o f the 
testator’s death. T h e  unborn first child would have a contingent 
rem ainder which would vest in interest immediately upon his birth.
If a testator were to devise Blackacre to his son A for life with 
rem ainder to A’s widow, then the rem ainder interest in the widow would 
be contingent if A were still living at the time o f the testator’s death
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*(107(1), 2 Wm. Saunders »80; 85 E R I 181 (K.B.D.). 
•Ibid.. at 1192.
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because a living person cannot have a widow. Since A’s widow cannot be 
ascertained until his death  the rem ainder will continue to be contingent 
while A lives. If  he dies leaving a widow then the rem ainder will vest 
both in interest and in possession.
If  a testator devises Blackacre to his son A for life with rem ainder to 
the first o f A’s children who becomes a medical doctor, then the 
rem ainder will be contingent if none o f A’s children is a medical doctor 
at the time o f the testator’s death. T h e  condition precedent would have 
to be satisfied before any o f A’s children could claim a vested interest in 
the property.
In each o f these cases the fu tu re  interest is contingent. 
Consequently, it is necessary to enquire  w hether it violates the rule 
against perpetuities (which may alternatively, and usefully, be re ferred  
to as the “rule against rem oteness o f vesting”). T h e  answer in each case 
is that the interest does not violate the rule. T h e  rules o f law with 
respect to contingent rem ainders are such that any o f  those three 
interests will not be perm itted  to vest except d u rin g  A’s lifetime o r on 
his death. And since A is a life in being at the time o f creation o f the 
interests it is not possible, therefore, for any o f them  to vest beyond lives 
in being plus 21 years. T h e  rules in relation to contingent rem ainders 
will be explored in greater detail below.
T o  ascertain w hether a fu tu re interest violates the rule against 
. perpetuities it is necessary to determ ine what is causing the interest to be 
contingent and w hether it is possible for that contingency to be satisfied 
beyond the perpetuities period. I f  it is then the interest is void ab initio.
Let us suppose, for example, that a testator, being an avid hockey 
fan, makes the following testam entary disposition:
I devise Blackacre to Bernard (“Boom Boom") Geoffreon and his heirs, but if 
the Toronto Maple Leafs should win the Stanley Cup then to Punch Imlach 
and his heirs.
T he interest in Imlach is contingent upon the Maple Leafs winning 
the Stanley Cup. Is it possible that that could happen beyond the 
perpetuities period? Since the answer is clearly in the affirm ative the 
interest is void.
What m ight the testator have done in o rd e r to prevent the interest 
from  violating the rule? T h ere  were several avenues open to him by 
which to limit the possible vesting o f the interest to the perpetuities 
period. For exam ple, any o f the following prescriptions would have 
accomplished that end.
(a) . . .  but if the Toronto Maple Leafs should win the Stanley Cup during 
Punch Imlach’s lifetime then . . .
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(b) . . . but if the Toronto Maple Leafs should win the Stanley Cup during 
the lifetime o f  any person who is a member o f  that team at the time o f  
my death then . .  .
(c) The vesting period prescribed in (a) or (b) could be extended by adding 
after "lifetime” the words "or within 21 years thereafter”.
T he purpose could be accomplished as well by limiting the vesting 
to a period o f 21 years next following the testator’s death. T hus, . , but 
if the T oronto  Maple Leafs should win the Stanley C up within 21 years 
after my death  then . . .” would protect the interest from  being void ab 
initio. O f course, if in any o f those cases the interest did not vest by the 
time the prescribed period ran out then it would be destroyed. However, 
it would nave had at least a chance to take effect.
A nother m ethod by which the testator might have prevented the 
interest from  being void ab initio would have been by giving Imlach a 
life estate ra ther than a fee. A life estate can obviously take effect only 
d u ring  the lifetime o f  the intended life tenant. If, therefore, a 
contingent life interest is given to a life in being, there is no way that 
that interest can vest beyond the perpetuities period. It can only vest 
du ring  the lifetime o f the life tenan t who is a life in being.
TIMELY VESTING RULE
A contingent freehold rem ainder must be supported  by a 
preceeding vested freehold estate. Since the law does not permit 
rem ainders afte r fee simple estates, and since the fee tail has been 
abolished by statute, the only kind o f freehold estate which can support 
contingent freehold rem ainders is the life estate. Accordingly, a 
contingent rem ainder for life o r in fee simple must be preceded by one 
o r m ore vested life estates.
T h e  timely vesting rule provides, in effect, that a contingent 
f reehold rem ainder will be destroyed if it fails to vest by the time that all 
preceding vested estates come to an end. T hus, if when the vested life 
estate comes to an end the rem ainder is still contingent, it will come to 
an end as well because there will no longer be a vested estate to support 
it.
T h e  timely vesting rule is, in effect, a “wait and see” rule. It waits to 
see if the contingent rem ainder will vest in time. If it does not then it is 
destroyed.
While the original purpose o f the timely vesting rule was to prevent 
an abeyance o f seisin and thereby reinforce the feudal system, its 
principal purpose and consequence today is similar to that o f  the rule 
against perpetuities; that is, to prevent land from being subject to 
contingencies for too long.
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While all contingent fu ture interests are subject to the rule against 
perpetuities it is clear that some such interests can never violate the rule. 
A first contingent rem ainder can never violate the rule against 
perpetuities because it must be preceded immediately by a vested life 
estate; and, being subject to the timely vesting rule, it m ust vest by the 
time and preceding “life in being" dies o r it will be destroyed. T hus, it is 
not possible for a first contingent rem ainder to vest beyond lives in 
being plus twenty-one years.
If, however, a conveyance o r devise creates successive contingent 
rem ainders then the second and subsequent contingent rem ainders may 
violate the rule against perpetuities notw ithstanding the timely vesting 
rule. Let us suppose, for exam ple, that a testator were to create the 
following devises.
I devise Blackacre to niv son A for life and on his death for his widow for life
and on her death for the first o f  A’s children who shall become a medical
doctor.
Assuming that A is living at the time o f the testator’s death he 
would take a present vested life estate in Blackacre. T he rem ainder in 
the widow for life would be contingent because the widow would be 
unascertained at the time. Assuming that none o f the A’s children had 
become a medical doctor by the time o f the testator’s death  then that 
rem ainder in fee simple would also be contingent. T h e  rem ainder in the 
widow is the first contingent rem ainder and that in A's child is a 
subsequent contingent rem ainder.
Because o f the timely vesting rule the rem ainder in the widow must 
vest upon A’s death  o r it will be destroyed. Since A is a life in being his 
widow’s rem ainder cannot vest beyond the perpetuities period. However, 
u n d er the timely vesting rule the interest in A’s child does not have to 
vest until the interest in A’s widow comes to an end. If, therefore, it is 
possible for the widow to die beyond the perpetuities period then the 
timely vesting rule would perm it the interest in A’s child to vest beyond 
the perpetuities period. In that case, the interest would be rendered  void 
by the rule against perpetuities.
In this case the contingent rem ainder in A’s child would not be 
saved by the timely vesting rule. N either the widow nor the child is 
necessarily a life in being at the time o f the testator's death. It is possible 
for both the widow and the child to be born after the testator’s death 
and for the widow to die and the child to become a medical doctor m ore 
than twenty-one years after the death o f A, the only known relevant life 
in being.
In short, while the application o f the timely vesting rule can enable 
an interest to escape the rule against perpetuities it does not necessarily 
produce that result. In o ther words, it does not perm it us to “wait and 
see’’ in all cases.
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RULE IN PUREPOY V. ROGERS
As a consequence o f the enactm ent o f the Statute o f  Uses in 1535 it 
became possible to create new types o f legal fu tu re  interests. Those 
so-called executory interests include the shifting interest which takes 
effect by divesting a preceding estate in a grantee, and the springing 
interest which takes effect in the fu tu re by divesting the g ran to r’s title.
Executory interests were spawned and n u rtu red  in equity as 
springing and shifting uses and became legal interests only by virtue o f 
the Statute o f Uses. Having grown up  outside the common law they were 
not subjected to the destructibility rules which were developed in 
relation to legal rem ainders. Consequently, an executory interest is not 
necessarily destroyed simply because it fails to vest by the time a 
preceding estate in ano ther grantee comes to an end.
Let us suppose, for example, that a testator were to provide as 
follows:
I devise Blackacre to my widow for life and after her death for the first o f  my
children who shall become a medical doctor.
As a springing executory interest the devise for the child can vest 
whenever a child o f  the testator becomes a medical doctor at anytime in 
the future, w hether before o r afte r the widow’s death. In o ther words, it 
is not subject to the timely vesting rule and can subsist as a contingent 
interest even after the preceding interest in the widow has come to an 
end. As a result Blackacre rem ains subject to the contingency as long as 
any child o f the testator is still living and no such child has become a 
medical doctor.
While executory interests are subject to the rule against perpetuities 
it is apparen t that they can cause property  to be tied-up subject to 
contingencies for longer periods than rem ainders can. It was for the 
purpose o f preventing this that the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers was 
developed. T h e  rule was stated by Hale C. J. as follows:
Where a contingency is limited to depend on an estate o f  freehold which is
capable o f  supporting a remainder, it shall never be construed to be an
executory devise, but a contingent remainder only, and not otherwise.7
U nder the rule a fu tu re interest which could take effect as either a 
contingent rem ainder o r an executory interest m ust take effect as a 
contingent rem ainder. T h e  interest is thus subjected to the timely vested 
rule and will be destroyed if it does not vest by the time the preceding 
estate ends.
7John Chipman ('»rav, The Rule Against Perpetuitits (4th ed.), (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942) at 
191.
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T o  determ ine w hether the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers applies to the 
last exam ple cited above one must ascertain w hether the interest in the 
widow is capable o f supporting  a contingent rem ainder in freehold and 
w hether it is possible for the contingency to be satisfied before the estate 
in the widow comes to an end. T he  answer to each question is, “Yes”. 
T h e  widow’s life estate can support a contingent rem ainder in freehold; 
and it is possible for a child o f  the testator to become a medical doctor 
before the widow’s death. Consequently, the devise to the child is a 
contingent rem ainder and not a springing executory interest. T he 
“contingency period” is thus limited to the lifetime o f  the widow and will 
not continue for the lifetimes o f the children.
Because the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers was designed to restrict the 
ability o f g rantors to subject property  to contingencies it was natural for 
conveyancers to take a negative attitude towards the rule and to seek 
m eans o f  avoiding it. T h e  rule can be avoided easily by giving to the 
“preceding gran tee” a determ inable term  o f years o r a fee simple subject 
to condition subsequent, neither o f which can support a contingent 
rem ainder in freehold. Alternatively, the fu tu re  interest can be limited 
in such a way as to ren d er it incapable o f vesting du ring  the preceding 
life estate, thus preventing it from  being construed as a contingent 
rem ainder.
T h e  purpose o f this note, however, is to highlight a positive feature 
o f the rule which appears to have attracted little atten tion .8 Application 
o f the rule can enable a fu tu re interest to escape being declared void ab 
initio by rendering  the rule against perpetuities inapplicable. In such 
cases, the ab initio rule against perpetuities is replaced by the wait and 
see timely vesting rule, thus m aking it possible for the g ran to r’s 
intention to be fulfilled, at least in part.
Let us suppose, for example, that a testator were to provide as 
follows:
I devise Blackacre to my son A for life and after his death for such o f  his
children as shall attain the age o f  twenty-five years.
T h e  testator’s intention is probably that any child o f A who attains 
the age o f twenty-five years, w hether before o r after A’s death, is to take 
a share o f the estate in Blackacre. In o ther words, he probably intends 
that the vesting o f  a child’s interest can take place after A’s life estate has 
come to an end. On that basis, however, the children’s interest would be 
void as violating the rule against perpetuities. A is the only relevant life 
in being at the time the testator’s death. Since it is possible for a child o f 
A to reach the age o f  twenty-five m ore than twenty-one years after A’s
'Indeed, Purefoy v. Rogers seems to have attracted little attention generally in Canada. It is not 
mentioned in the “Cases Judicially Considered" volumes of the Canadian Abridgment, second edition.
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death it is possible for the interest to vest beyond the perpetuities 
period. Consequently, as an executory interest the devise for the 
children would be void ab initio.
However, the devise for the children satisfies the requirem ents for 
application o f the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers. T he  estate devised to A is 
capable o f supporting a contingent rem ainder in freehold and it is 
possible for the contingency, the attaining o f the age o f twenty-five 
years, to be satisfied du rin g  A’s lifetime. As a result the interest in the 
children m ust be construed as a contingent rem ainder ra ther than an 
executory interest.
As a first contingent rem ainder the ch ildren’s interest cannot violate 
the rule against perpetuities because its vesting period is limited to the 
lifetime o f  a life in being, A. In effect, therefore, the application o f the 
rule in Purefoy v. Rogers to a case o f this sort causes the ab initio rule o f 
destruction, the rule against perpetuities, to be replaced by a wait and 
see rule o f destruction, the timely vesting rule. T his is the positive side 
o f Purefoy v. Rogers, the side which provides the opportunity  for at least 
part o f the g ran to r’s intention to be realized.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
While the principal purpose o f this note is to reacquaint 
practitioners in New Brunswick with the Rule in Purefoy v. Rogers and to 
dem onstrate how it might be utilized to the client’s advantage, it 
underlines as well the need for reform  o f  ou r law o f property  in general 
and o f  the rule against perpetuities in particular. It is greatly to o u r 
disadvantage and discredit that we continue to be governed by 
exceedingly technical rules which were developed in another era  to meet 
the needs o f  social, economic and political systems which are very 
d ifferen t from  o u r own. O u r inertia appears to be without justification 
when one notes the extensive reform s which have been undertaken in 
o ther jurisdictions, including the jurisdiction from which ou r rules were 
derived and in which they have long since been abandoned o r radically • 
revised.9
While identification o f specific areas o f reform  is beyond the scope 
o f this note it is appropriate  to suggest that the “m ischief’ which 
the timely vesting rule, the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers and the rule against 
perpetuities were designed and in tended to com bat could be dealt with 
quite adequately by the adoption o f a “wait and see” ru le against 
perpetuities. Precedents are available.10
“Reference should be made in particular to the English Law o f Property Act 1929 and Perpetuities and 
Accumulations Act 1964.
1"Supra, footnotes 1 and 2.
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A CASE IN POINT
It appears likely that the most recently reported  New Brunswick 
case involving failure un d er the rule against perpetuities would have 
been decided differently if appropriate  reform s had been effected. In Re 
Foumes E state11 the C ourt was asked to determ ine w hether the following 
provisions o f the will o f  Albert A. Fownes were “invalid by reason o f 
being contrary to the Rule against Perpetuities o r for any o ther reason”.
3(i) T o provide in their absolute discretion for my children and grandchildren 
(including those born after my death) preferably the latter in case o f  illness or 
if in the opinion o f  my trustees they or any o f  them are in necessitous 
circumstances and in the case o f  my grandchildren (including those born after 
my death) for their education.
3 (j) At the end o f  a period o f  twenty-five years from the date o f  my death or 
upon the death o f  my sister, the said Cora G. Fownes, whichever is the longer 
period, to terminate this trust and divide my property as follows: Seventy (70) 
per cent to my children and grandchildren (including those born after my 
death) in equal shares and thirty (30) per cent to my nephews and nieces then 
living in equal shares. If none o f  my children or grandchildren (including 
those born after my death) are then living all my property shall be divided 
among my said nephews and nieces in equal shares.
T he answer given by the learned C hief Justice was as follows:
The vesting is unspecified in paragraph 3(i) o f  the Will under consideration 
and paragraph 3 (j) provides for a term o f  twenty-five years from the death o f  
the testator before the trust is terminated and vesting can occur. It is clear 
that as far as paragraphs 3(i) and 3(j) o f  the Will there is no vesting within the 
required period and therefore the said paragraphs are void by reason o f  
being contrary to the rule against perpetuities.12
U nder paragraph  3(i) the trustees were given an absolute discretion 
as to w hether to confer any benefits on the children and grandchildren. 
Consequently, the beneficiaries could not be construed as having vested 
interests in the trust property. T aken alone that provision would have 
perm itted  the property  to be tied up  in the trust as long as any child or 
grandchild o f the testator still lived without the necessity that any benefit 
be actually conferred  on any o f them . T hat would not have been 
offensive, per se, had the class o f  beneficiaries been confined to the 
testator’s children and those o f his g randchildren  who were living at the 
time o f  his death. Property may be tied up  in a private trust fo r the 
perpetuities period o f lives in being plus twenty-one years. H ere, 
however, the class was not confined to lives in being. G randchildren 
born afte r the testator’s death  were also included. As a consequence, 
un d er the term s o f paragraph  3(i) taken alone it would have been 
possible for the property  to have been tied up, and the ultim ate vesting 
on the term ination o f the trust to have been postponed, beyond the 
perpetuities period.
"(1975), 10 N.B.R. (2d) 226 (N.B.Q.B.). 
,2lbid., at 228.
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Paragraph 3(i) cannot be read in isolation, however. It must be read 
and construed in conjunction with paragraph  3(j) which placed a time 
limit on the duration  o f the trust and, therefore , on the postponem ent 
o f  the vesting. U nder that provision the trust was to come to an end  and 
the property  was to vest in the children, grandchildren  and nephews 
and nieces “At the end o f  a period o f  twenty-five years from  the date o f 
my death  o r upon the death  o f my sister, Cora G. Fownes, whichever is 
the longer period. . .”.
H ad the testator limited the duration  o f  the trust and, therefore, the 
vesting period to twenty-one years from  the date o f his death  o r to the 
lifetime o f his sister, o r  any o ther life o r lives in being, o r to a period o f 
a life o r lives in being plus twenty-one years, then in all probability the 
interests could have been protected because all o f  those alternatives 
would be within the perpetuities period. Indeed, it would have been 
possible by using some o f those alternatives to have postponed the 
vesting for m ore than twenty-five years after his death.
However, the use o f  the twenty-five year period is not perm itted 
un d er o u r common law perpetuities rule. A period o f twenty-five years 
can come to an end m ore than twenty-one years after the death  o f  a life 
o r lives in being. T h erefo re , any period o f vesting defined in term s o f 
an absolute num ber o f years must be confined to twenty-one o r less.
As things tu rned  out in this case the twenty-five year alternative 
would have been the relevant vesting period because the testator’s sister, 
C ora G. Fownes, predeceased him. Nevertheless, the case does clearly 
point up the artificiality and harshness o f  the com m on law perpetuities 
rule. It operated  in this case to destroy provisions based on a twenty-five 
year vesting period while the testator, properly advised, could have 
provided for a considerably longer vesting period without violating the 
rule.
H ad New Brunswick adopted  reform s similar to those contained in 
the English Perpetuities and Accumulations Act o f 1964 the provisions in 
question in the Fownes case should have been held valid. T h a t Act 
perm its the use o f an alternative to the perpetuity  period based on lives 
in being. It allows the g ran to r o r testator to specify a fixed period o f 
years not exceeding eighty as the perpetuity  period. A lthough that Act 
would probably require that the period so chosen be m ore clearly 
expressed by the testator as being a perpetuities period than the Fowne’s 
will does, nevertheless, the period o f twenty-five years so chosen would 
clearly have fallen within the perm itted limits, and the testator would 
not have died partially intestate.
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